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Local governments’ regulations and donor organizations’ requirements create political 
and financial restrictions for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). As a result NGOs in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco must 
become creative in the ways they develop and implement projects. In order to be efficient and 
successful, NGOs use different techniques including creative means to fund their programs, 
partnerships with outside organizations, and creative uses of their resources. 
Many NGOs will find creative solutions to navigate these restrictions. Some of the 
solutions will be similar, while others will be completely unique. Yet despite the specific 
variations in the strategies from NGO to NGO, the fact that each one has its own is noteworthy 
in that these particular strategies allow NGOs to more effectively serve their communities. As 
the Middle East and North Africa continue to change, the restrictions placed on NGOs by the 
government and the types of organizations that develop will change; and ultimately, navigation 
strategies will also change. Therefore, it is important to study the navigational methods and 
strategies used by NGOs in this region due to the fluid political scene, as well as an overall lack 
of research on this topic.  
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Local governments’ regulations and donor organizations’ requirements create political 
and financial restrictions for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). As a result NGOs in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco must 
become creative in the ways they develop and implement projects. In order to be efficient and 
successful, NGOs use different techniques including creative means to fund their programs, 
partnerships with outside organizations, and creative uses of their resources. 
Research Design  
During my semester studying abroad in Jordan, I explored ways in which Jordanian 
NGOs continue to function effectively in their targeted communities despite challenges set up by 
donors’ requirements and the government’s regulations. In many cases I discovered that NGOs 
in Jordan were continuing to meet the needs of their targeted communities through the use of 
community meetings and panels as well as constant participants’ feedback. Using this research as 
a starting point, I then expanded the project geographically to look at how NGOs from three 
countries in the region—Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco—creatively navigate their financial, legal, 
and political environments. I chose these countries due to their recent participation in the Arab 
Spring, which Economist John Cummings and diplomat Colbert Held describe as a set of popular 
uprisings that occurred in multiple countries throughout the region starting in 2011, and due to 
their close proximity to one another in North Africa (Cummings and Held 2014, 573-574). This 
thesis is based on the archival, library, and online research of secondary sources that address this 
question. My research design included the following steps:  
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1. In order to explore my hypothesis that donors’ regulations and requirements 
hinder the work of NGOs, I read articles that cover NGOs work in any country 
in the world (e.g., Shaw, Allen, 2004; Jad 2007; Johansson, Elgstrom, 
Kimanzu, Nylund and Persson 2010). 
2. Then, I focused more closely on MENA. Originally, I focused on Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Libya, but as I could not find enough information about Libya, I 
decided to change my focus to Morocco. I discovered that there were very few 
sources that focus specifically on these countries’ NGOs and their relations 
with donors (e.g., Newcomer, Baradei, and Garcia 2013). As a result, I had to 
expand my search and look for information about the regional NGOs. 
3. This led me to discover the importance of governmental regulations vis-à-vis 
local NGOs. For example, Mohamed ElAgati (2010), the executive director of 
the Arab Forum for Alternatives, discusses the governmental influence on 
NGOs in MENA. Hence, I continued archival research by compiling names of 
NGOs and donor organizations that I would have to research further. 
4. Once I compiled a list of regional NGOs and donor organizations, I used the 
online search engine - Google - to gather data about NGOs most prominently 
featured in the literature I reviewed. In some cases, I could not find a clear 
website for the organization, and many of the supporting websites were in 
languages other than English. For example there are a few supporting websites 
in French that talk about one NGO I decided to focus on - Association 
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Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates (or AFTD)1 Yet in other cases, such as 
with Enda Inter-Arabe (or Enda), the website had detailed information about 
this organization2 Through such websites, I was able to find the organizations’ 
histories, partnerships, and projects, as well as how they promote themselves. 
In addition to digital documents published by the NGOs, I was also able to 
collect, what I call “physical” evidences, such as each organization’s website’s 
set-up, its accessibility, user friendliness, and its attractiveness. These criteria 
are usually not considered when assessing effectiveness of an NGO. Yet in the 
context of the globalization of technology, digital presence is an important 
feature that can hinder or enhance an NGO’s creativity and function; an 
organizations online presence helps to create first impressions for donors and 
possible partners.  
5.  Finally, drawing on a combination of my own observations, information gleaned 
from websites, as well as a review of some existing scholarship on MENA, I 
analyzed several NGOs in each country, focusing specifically on how they 
shape their programs in order to creatively navigate restrictions. 
Introduction 
 In order to receive outside funding for programs and overhead costs, NGOs in MENA 
have to creatively navigate local and global social space by negotiating donor expectations and 
the political structures of their countries. Donor expectations take many forms and include, but 
                                                          
1 See, for example, https://www.facebook.com/femmesdemocrates. 








not limited to, the collection of quantitative data to insure accountability to the donor, funding 
application requirements, and preset program expectations. 
In the past four decades there has been an increased demand from donors for systematic 
data on the effectiveness of public and non-profit programs (Newcomer, Baradei, and Garcia 
2013, 62). As a result of a growing demand for financial accountability and improved services, 
the funding pool for NGOs has become increasingly more competitive. Kathryn Newcomer, 
Laila El Baradei, and Sandra Garcia (2013, 62), scholars of public policy, practice, and 
administration, explain that,  
Over the last four decades, the demand for systematic data about the effectiveness of 
public and non-profit programs has increased because of the non-coincidental 
convergence of actions by a number of institutions with stakes in service delivery. In 
countries across the world, governments at all levels, foundations, funders of 
international development endeavors such as the World Bank and the US Agency for 
International Development (AID), the United Way of America in the USA, think tanks, 
and academics with interests in improving the delivery of services have all contributed to 
an increasing focus on measurement of programmatic ‘results’ as part of the exercise of 
accountability for the funds.  
 
The majority of international donors require such systematic data on programs. This demand for 
accountability creates more work for already strained NGOs as they must allocate resources to 
collect quantitative data (Newcomer, Baradei, and Garcia 2013, 73).  
These strains are caused by requirements that can include evidences of an NGO’s 
program’s impact, such as (a) the number of people affected by the program, (b) its success rates, 
and (c) whether or not the program is achieving its goal(s), as well as language requirements on 
funding applications which are beyond the current employees’ skills. This data required by donor 








Despite the multiple uses cited for performance data, several NGOs were not completely 
satisfied with the overall performance measurement and reporting processes and 
expressed various concerns. One of these concerns was that international donors may 
insist on the collection of specific, sometimes not totally relevant data, to satisfy their 
political agendas, for example, to collect information about levels of political 
participation and engagement of political parties in projects relating to children. Another 
concern voiced was the overemphasis on quantitative data, which do not always capture 
the whole picture.  
 
Many NGOs find that these reports are not only unhelpful, but also often hinder the programs. 
The information that donors request cannot be used by NGOs to further improve their programs. 
In addition, each donor has a different format for these reports with different language 
requirements, and a focus on different results to be measured. This process, both collecting data 
and report requirements requires NGOs to reserve time and divert resources form the beneficiary 
and instead spend it to make sure these reports are completed. Some NGOs even find it 
necessary to employ individuals or contractors to write these reports, which require spending 
extra money that NGOs may not be able to spare (ElAgati 2010, 70).  
 The Regional Director of Civil Society Programs at the organization Middle East and North 
Africa for Search for Common Ground, Julia Pitner (2000, 36), , discovered that when applying 
for European grants, the 
 reporting and accounting requirements are beyond the capacity of most local NGOs. The EC 
[European Commission], confronting its own corruption scandal, has changed its guidelines 
further by only making grants over 400,000 ECU [European Currency Unit or $429,696] to 
NGOs with a bank guarantee for the same amount.  
 
With the requirements of reporting data outside the abilities of many NGOs, and with additional 
regulations such as the fund matching required by the EC, local NGOs cannot meet the 
requirements to apply for funding. This is causing many donors to have to go directly to NGOs.  
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 With donors approaching NGOs, in some cases, one would think that NGOs would be 
able to produce the programs they want in a community without too much hassle. Yet, “other 
funders, particularly US funders, now go directly to NGOs, and suggest that funds will be 
forthcoming if certain changes are made in projects or if the NGO undertakes the funder’s 
project” (Pitner 2000, 36). This leads to NGOs changing everything from the specific details of 
their programs to their overall focus in order to receive money and make their programs appeal 
to donors. An example, an anthropologist Rania Kassab Sweis (2011, 41), who studies the effects 
of humanitarian aid in Egypt, reports that one of her research participants, Philippe, an Egyptian 
NGO employee, says,  
The poor African girl brings aid money like no one else. Yes we use this to our advantage 
but it’s the only way we can get funding. We have to use a stereotype to get money. This 
“clash of civilizations” story, Islam versus Christianity, using pictures of veiled Muslim 
girls… I hate that stuff, but it brings the money. I know it’s exploitation, I know exactly 
what it is, but we have to play the politics. The funds keep the work going, we have to 
reach out and get [funds] any way we can. We have to work with these [NGO] politics 
and this system.  
In sum, in order to achieve needed funding levels, NGOs may need to create new programs or 
expand existing ones to include the donor’s target group, or rely on stereotypical cultural 
constructs to appeal to donors.  
This creation and use of stereotypes may seem like a good method for receiving funds 
that NGOs can use to implement programs. Yet, donors who come to an NGO with program 
ideas in mind, which can cause further strain on this NGO. Pitner (2000, 35), argues that,  
NGOs are becoming more frustrated with the international funding community, 
especially Western governmental funding agencies such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the European Commission (EC). Local 
perception-which is also frequently fact-is that they come to the region with agendas 
rooted in specific foreign policy objectives seeking "partners" to unquestioningly carry 
out programs that seldom resonate with the political situation on the ground. 
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These funding agencies and donors, who have preset expectations for a project, create an 
environment in which NGOs must compromise their own project ideas. This can result in 
projects that do not fit the community’s specific needs. In addition, these preset ideas and 
subsequent program changes can result in the loss of an NGO’s legitimacy among the 
community members; the community often feels that the NGOs are settling and promoting 
foreign ideologies that do not fit within the community’s ideologies. This lack of trust between 
donors, NGOs, and communities creates social and financial hardship on NGOs. 
These donor-related problems make it very difficult for NGOs to create programs that 
help the community and, at the same time, satisfy donors’ expectations. In addition to these 
hindrances caused by donor restrictions, NGOs are also strained by governmental restrictions. In 
addition to each government’s unique methods of social control, the governments have their own 
way of restricting NGOs through various methods, such as registration requirements and funding 
reporting.  
While NGOs are not run by the government, that does not exclude them from the 
government’s influence. In many countries in the region, NGOs must register with the 
government. By either not allowing NGOs to register or discrediting an NGO’s services that are 
incompatible with, or threaten a government’s interests, the government regulates and controls 
local NGOs. For example, Mary Ayad (2012, 85), a scholar of accounting and corporate 
governance, reports that, 
The CIVICUS3 study found obstacles to the function of CSOs, particularly the Law of 
Association, which served to prohibit “any action against national unity” or “corrupting 
                                                          








the public morals”. It was feared this law could be used against NGOs. The emergency 
law enacted in 1981 prohibits public demonstrations without government permission. The 
emergency law of 1981 is unconstitutional on the grounds that Article 54 provides the 
right of citizens to peaceable and unarmed private assembly, without the need for prior 
notice, and inter alia, that public meetings, processions and gatherings are allowed within 
the limits of the law. 
Such laws allow the government to legally disband NGOs and break up its meetings and events. 
While many argue that this law is illegal, there is little legal ground on which to combat it. This 
puts the staff of NGOs in distress and causes them change programs, in order to align with the 
government. Federal rules and regulations vary from country to country, but in many cases they 
prevent an NGO from receiving funding, implementing programs, and in some cases, operating. 
These techniques, as defined by anthropologists Serena Nanda and Richard Lee Warms (2009, 
200) can be spilt into two categories: (a) laws, “in which social control is implemented through 
the systematic application of force by a constituted authority in society,” and (b) informal social 
control, in which the government uses informal techniques, such as the media portrayal of this 
NGO and delays of the registration. These restrictions placed on NGOs by donors and the 
government create an environment in which NGOs must develop strategies to navigate these 
restrictions in order to best serve their communities.  
Roadmap 
In the following sections of the thesis, I provide a general background of regional NGOs 
and explain the types I used in my research. Then I create a country profile, which looks at (a) 
history and demographics of each country, (b) the most common donor restrictions faced by 
NGOs and country’s political environment when it comes to NGOs’ actions, (c) give two to three 
examples of NGOs from each country to demonstrate how, and in what ways, each one of them 
creatively navigates its socio-economic and political environment, and (d) analyze creative 
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efforts of these individual NGOs. I conclude the thesis by comparing creative methods, 
strategies, and techniques of these NGOs, I include the following NGOs: (a) Al-Hilal, Misr El 
Kheir, and Magdy Yacoub in Egypt; (b) ATFD, and Enda in Tunisia; and (c) Al-Amana and the 
Najra Belghazi Center in Morocco, and discuss how individual NGO’s creativity and 
productivity were shaped by their respective political and bureaucratic environments.  
The Term “NGO” Defined 
The work of an NGO is important as they receive funding to help support and develop 
their local communities. These community-oriented organizations hold advantages when doing 
regional projects. Maha M Abdelrahman (2004, 172), a scholar at the center of developmental 
studies at the University of Cambridge, writes that NGOs are unique because of, “Their 
distinctive methods of researching all members of the local community and their ability to 
initiate and maintain close ties with the recipients of their services, or ‘beneficiaries’ as they are 
known in the NGO jargon.” These organizations have strong links in the community and are 
considered “peoples’ organizations” with “people centered development” that empower the 
communities and people they work with (Abdelrahman 2004, 172). These beliefs inform the 
expectation that NGOs are community-based organizations, which are separate and unhindered 
by the government. In reality, however, NGOs are not the only organizations that work to serve 
their communities, and their relationships with local governments are often unclear.  
The classification of NGOs includes different types of organizations. Local definitions of 
NGOs point out that the term “Nongovernmental” in the acronym “NGO” is, in a way, deceptive 
and certainly limiting. In many cases, local NGOs are affiliated with the government; they are 
regulated by state laws and, in some cases, are created by the government. For instance, in 
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Tunisia the “Government displayed considerable creativity when it decided to create its own 
NGOs (governmental NGOs or GNGOs), staffed by members of the general intelligence services 
(mukhabarat), to attend conferences and monitor what was being said about Tunisia” (Pitner 
2000, 35). This fact is echoed by a sociologist, Sarah Gilman (2007, 99), who states, “Thanks to 
a tight state control exercised through the Tunisian laws of association, most nongovernmental 
organizations(NGOs) in Tunisia function as examples of that interesting breed of ‘governmental 
non-governmental organizations.”’ Shelia Carapico (2000, 2), a political scientist, explains that 
this creates confusion as NGOs may be influenced or even run by the government, the very 
entity from which their name separates them. These organizations are known as Governmental 
Nongovernmental Organizations (GNGOs). In other cases, NGOs are not locally created; 
instead, they are branches of various international organizations. These, accordingly, are often 
referred to as International Nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). Often NGOs, GNGOs, and 
INGOs are lumped together and classified as NGOs though they all have different levels of 
association with local communities and governments (Carapico 2000, 2).  
There are also other organizations that fit the definition of the community centered NGO, 
but are not classified as such. These organizations are sometimes called Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) or Community Based Organizations (CBOs). In other cases they are 
religiously affiliated and, in MENA, are often considered Islamic Organizations (Carapico 2000, 
2). Keeping the complexity of these organizations in mind, all of them must creatively navigate 
their political and socio-economic environments in order to most effectively help the community. 
In this thesis, the NGOs I focus on include CSOs, CBOs, and Islamic organizations. 
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NGOs are highly valued actors in local communities because of their perceived 
independence. Abdelrahman (2004, 51) writes that, 
One side argues that NGOs’ greatest advantage is their independence from political and 
financial institutions, for example from national governments and MNC [Multinational 
Corporations]. Conversely, NGOs are presented as completely dependent on these 
institutions, with the effect that NGOS become more accountable to them than to their 
supposed beneficiaries. A more balanced view, however, points out the interdependence 
between NGOs and the state.  
This perception of independence revolves around the notion that NGOs are not influenced by 
governments and thus can create programs best suited the local community’s needs. Thus, NGOs 
are not as independent as they are perceived; they are constrained by rules and regulations from 
both governments and funding agencies. While each government’s rules are different, they all 
strive to control NGOs and protect the interests of the state.  
 Below I discuss each country individually, supplying a demographic profile and historical 
background, a description of country specific governmental regulations, and two to three 
examples of NGOs and how they navigate restrictions. 
Country Profiles 
Egypt 
Demographic Profile and Historical Background 
Egypt, located in North Africa, has a long history of foreign occupations. The 
reunification of the Upper and Lower Nile valley in 3000 BCE resulted in the formation of an 
integrated Egypt (Cummings and Held 2014, 572). Since that time, Egypt has been occupied by 
the Persians (525 BCE), the Greeks, and the Romans (30 BCE-476 CE), and then by the 
Byzantine Empire (476- 640 CE). During the occupation by the Romans and the Byzantine 
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Empire, some of its population experienced a religious shift from a diverse polytheistic belief 
system to Christianity currently represented by the Coptic Christian minority in the country 
(Cummings and Held 2014, 572). The next important transformation affecting Egyptian culture 
occurred in 642 CE; the Muslim Arab conquest introduced the Arabic language and Islam to its 
population (Ibid.). At first, Egypt was ruled by several Arab dynasties: Ummayyads (661-750 
CE), and the Abbasids in (750 CE), and the Shia Fatimids (909-1171CE) (Stewart 2014, 72, 82). 
With the Ayyabids (1169-1250 CE), Sunni Islam had taken control of Egypt. Then the 
Mamlukes (slave soldiers under the Umayyad and Abbasid rule) established control in Egypt in 
1250 (Stewart 2014, 88,89). The Ottoman Turks ruled Egypt from 1517 until 1914 (Cummings 
and Held 2014, 572-573). In the late 19th century, the Ottoman’s control was weakened by the 
British presence in Egypt marking the beginning of the colonial period (Cummings and Held 
2014, 573). The first Egyptian revolution occurred in 1919 (Stewart 2014, 114).  
 Egypt gained independence from Britain in 1922. That same year, the Egyptians elected 
a parliament, but both the parliament and the monarchy remained heavily influenced by the 
British (Stewart 2014, 114). In 1952, a bloodless military coup sent the last king of the Alidline 
regime into exile, opening the way for Gamal Abal Nasser to become Egypt’s first President in 
1954 (Cummings and Held 2014, 573). Nasser ruled Egypt until 1981, when he suffered a fatal 
heart attack and was succeeded by Anwar al Sadat. Sadat was assassinated in 1981, and Hosni 
Mubarak became president. Mubarak extended his presidency until 2011 when the Arab Spring, 
ended his presidency (Cummings and Held 2014, 573-574).  
The Arab Spring in Egypt took the form of a massive uprising to remove President 
Mubarak in February 2011. The many reasons for the uprising included the regime’s corruption, 
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police brutality and corruption, and economic hardships faced by the population. John Sidel 
(2014), a scholar of comparative and international relations at the University of Oxford, explains 
that the uprisings led the military to force President Mubarak to step down. Then, the military ran 
an interim government until Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically elected President 
of Egypt (Sidel 2014, 227). Yet, in 2013, Morsi was removed from office and replaced by Gen. 
Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. The military once again held control of the government. In 2014, Gen. 
Abdel Fattah al-Sissi was elected as president of Egypt (Daily Mail 2014), while Morsi was 
sentenced to death in 2015. 
Egypt has a total population of 80.1 million with a population density of 75 people per 
km2 (Stewart 2014, 36). The county’s Gross National Income (GNI) is $1800, and the 
unemployment rate is 26% (Stewart 2014, 192). According to the Freedom House, Egypt scores 
a 6 and 5 in Political Freedoms and Civil Freedoms respectively and has a status of Not Free 
(Stewart 2014, 240). 
Government Restrictions 
In Egypt, the government controls local NGOs through (a) the laws regulating donations 
from foreign donors, requiring budget reviews and inspections by governmental agencies, the 
government’s ability to seize all assets of any NGO, if it deems necessary, and (b) through 
informal means such as delays in approvals and constant reapplication requirements.  
The laws regulating Egypt’s NGOs include Law 84 on Non-Governmental Organizations, 
passed in 2002, which states that NGOs may receive funding from foreign donors. According to 
ElAgati (2010, 10), this Law overturned the Law 32 on civil and voluntary associations: “Law 
No. 84 (on Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs) (2002), allows NGOs to receive foreign 
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funds.” Yet, “Law No. 84 contains several obstacles and restrictions to foreign funding, at both 
the legal and practical level” (ElAgati 2010, 10). 
 Law 84 makes it mandatory for all NGOs to obtain approval from the Egyptian Ministry 
of Social Solidarity to receive funding from foreign entities (ElAgati 2010, 10). Law 84 also 
gives the Ministry of Social Solidarity the power to deny a request for foreign funding when it 
sees fit. An Egyptian NGO worker’s statement exemplifies constrains put in place by this Law, 
We face many problems as a result of the multiple bodies overseeing foreign funding. As 
an organization, our activities are known and specific. I should not need to introduce the 
organization every time I apply for funding to the Ministry of Social Solidarity. 
Moreover, there are multiple steps to the process; every time I am compelled to secure 
new approval from the security department, which takes so much time. A few years ago, 
during our participation in the Coalition of NGOs organized to change the previous NGO 
Law, I began to face many problems from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, which 
rejected a number of applications submitted to get approval for funding (ElAgati 2010, 
13). 
 This process is often corrupt, and in many cases, the denial has nothing to do with the NGO’s 
project for which they need funding. Instead, it might be a consequence of this organization’s 
past activities, which might have gone against the government or the ministry itself. The 
government’s ability to hinder the foreign funding of an NGO can cause NGOs to be unable to 
start projects and pay the staff. This creates an NGO’s financial strains and may lead to the 
NGO’s closure. 
Additionally, the process for requesting foreign funding through the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity is very complicated. The application is sent from an administrative authority to the 
Directorate of Social Solidarity’s financing section, which, in turn, writes a report for the 
Ministry. The Ministry then sends the report to the Security Department (National Security 
Department - State Security). It is only after the Security Department’s approval that an NGO 
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can receive foreign funding. According to the law, this process should take no longer than 60 
days, yet many NGOs report waiting much longer for an approval from the Security Department 
(ElAgati 2010, 12). This long process and regular delays are examples of the government’s 
informal control which results in undue financial burden. ElAgati (2010, 12) writes that, “such 
delays not only impact on the implementation of a specific project, but may also threaten the 
NGO’s existence, where it undermines the NGO’s ability to pay wages and fulfill its 
obligations.” Without the money, NGOs are unable to pay their employees or fulfill obligations 
to its constituents, which creates a fundamental problem for NGOs. 
  In Egypt, the Ministry of Social Solidarity formally controls organizations through the 
review of any NGO budget that exceeds 1000EGP (Egyptian pound, roughly $180 USD), has the 
power to instantly disband any NGO, and can subject NGOs to long and detailed inspections. For 
instance, a member of one Egyptian NGO reported that the organization, 
Launched the campaign of "freedom of association." We used to conduct seminars and 
organize protests in front of the Ministry of Social Solidarity; then afterwards, or even 
during the protests, we received a phone call, informing us of an inspection by the 
Ministry and the Central Auditing Organization (CAO), though the CAO is not 
authorized to do so. Furthermore, there was security interference and threats of 
suspending the activities of the campaign (ElAgati 2010, 13).  
This statement clarifies that in many cases, the government agencies’ reviews, inspections, and a 
treat of disbandment are used to hinder this NGO’s activities and programs perceived by the state 
to undermine to the state’s interests. Such regulations and laws allow the Egyptian government 
to control local NGOs the existence of which can be jeopardized at the government’s whim. 
  The Egyptian government controls NGOs directly through laws and regulations, such as 
the Law No. 84, and indirection, through informal social sanctions such as delaying responses to 
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and requiring reapplication of an NGO. These methods hinder and dishearten NGOs who are 
perceived as a threat to the Egyptian government. 
Navigating Restrictions: Egyptian NGOs 
 Conversely, NGOs are not helpless against the restrictions placed on them by their 
government and donors. NGOs use different strategies in order to create programs and pay their 
staff. Egyptian NGOs, such as Al-Halil and Misr El Kheir and Magdy Yacoub, are successful 
organizations in spite of the socio-economic and political environment. Al-Halil uses data 
collection methods often required by donors, yet seen as a hindrance by many NGOs, to further 
promote its projects locally. In additions, they also use their designation as an Islamic 
organization to attract volunteers and donations from Egypt. Misr El Kheir4 and Magdy Yacoub5 
are both organizations circumnavigating the governmental donation requirements by having 
branches of their organization outside Egypt. They also help other local NGOs by providing sub-
grants that are classified as domestic donations, allowing smaller NGOs to receive money 
without applying to receive permission for an outside aid.  
Sherine Hafez (2011), an anthropologist and a scholar of gender and sexuality, writes 
about the Women’s Islamic Private Voluntary Organization (PVO), Al-Halil, which helps to 
empower women in Egypt through religion. One of the main projects of this PVO is to provide 
local women from the Mehmeit village with information about basic sanitation habits, set up 
classes on religion, and further develop women’s work related skill sets (Hafez 2011, 57). This 
program also provides money and loans that help participants improve their livelihood. Al-Halil 
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has found ways to use donor regulations such as quantitative data collection to promote local 
participation in the organization. Additionally, in order to lessen its dependency on foreign 
money Al-Halil relies on community donations and support to continue operating. 
As previously mentioned, many donors require quantitative data for their reports. Many 
NGOs consider this data to be superficial because it does not fully recognize the scope and 
progress of their work in any one area. It is also difficult to accurately record quantitative data. 
Many NGOs are short staffed and the quantity of data required is beyond their means and 
abilities. In order to collect data, NGOs in Egypt use a variety of methods including, surveys, 
follow up phone calls, focus groups, individual interviews, and evaluation sheets. The 
fieldworkers or other NGO staff or locals, organized with the help of community leaders, help to 
implement data collection methods. Hafez (2011) demonstrates an example of using community 
members to collect data on a project in the Mehmeit village in Egypt. Halima, a girl who lived in 
Mehmeit her whole life, works with Al-Halil in order to keep track of the women’s progress in 
the community. In this situation, 
Halima knew everyone by name without the help of a ledger because she had grown up in 
Mehmeit and knew all the village families well. One of her many tasks was to notify 
Amal and Samira when a family fell on hard times and needed help. Another of Hamila’s 
duties was to supervise the religious lessons, take attendance, and report back. In return 
for a monthly wage that was considered by village standards a good sum of money, 
Halima and her Father, and two other women from the village conducted the home 
inspections during the week (Hafez 2011, 144). 
This woman, like many others, helps this organization by collecting quantitative as well as 
qualitative data. As a result, Al-Halil is able to assess how many women are participating in the 
project and how well health-related routines are being incorporated into these women’s lives. 
These notes are not only helpful for the assessment of Al-Halil’s project, but they also help 
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encourage the participants to continue with the project (Hafez 2011, 132). Through good 
attendance and the passing of home inspections, the women are rewarded with clothing as well 
as other incentives; this helps to create a contractual relationship between the PVO and the 
villagers: 
[This was]basis of the exchange between the Islamic women activists and the village 
women. In return for their commitment to attending religious lessons, literacy classes, 
practicing hygiene, and working on several types of production, the village women were 
rewarded with gifts and monthly wages and were given an opportunity to receive loans 
towards their financial independence (Hafez 2011, 132). 
Al-Halil uses quantitative data to create incentives for local women to participate in the project, 
and produce an environment that promotes the growth of the Mehmeit village project. By 
keeping track of participants’ progress, the members of Al-Halil are able to motivate women to 
continue their hard work and recruit other women to join. With this additional use of quantitative 
data collected normally for the donor organizations, NGOs do not to waste resources on 
collecting information solely for donor-reports. Instead, the NGO gives back to the program by 
creating an environment that will keep women’s interest in the project and continue to increase 
their participation.  
The Al-Halil organization also navigates restrictions by accepting funding from sources 
other than foreign investors. Egyptian NGOs do not rely solely on donations from foreign 
investors in order to support projects. Funds for NGOs in Egypt can come from domestic 
donations, membership fees, and revenue from services (Abdelrahman 2004, 178). Each of these 
sources of revenue comes with difficulties of their own, yet they help local NGOs find a creative 
way to support themselves. For one, Al-Halil supports itself through domestic donations from the 
local community. The organization started when,  
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“Doctor Zeinab found an empty building in this neglected part of the 
suburb. It was still unfinished. Even the walls were bare, and there were no 
floors and no windows. We started bit by bit; it was just a huge job, but at 
the time that did not deter us. Soon with the money coming in from people 
around this neighborhood, we got one floor ready” (Hafez 2011, 82). 
Hence, the members of Al-Halil did not need to rely on international funding; instead 
they were able to develop an organization with the funding received from the local community.  
Al-Halil is an Islamic based organization, which also gives the women of this 
organization the ability to maneuver within the realm of funding more easily. For example, in 
order to gain services for the constituents such as healthcare, education, governmental, and 
administrative help for the organization, Al-Halil relies on donations from professionals and 
community members. These professionals volunteer their time and services as a form of alms 
giving (called Zakat), which community members see as an Islamic requirement.  
 In other cases, CSOs such as Misr El Kheir (MEK) and Magdy Yacoub Foundation 
(MYF) supply sub-grants to smaller CSOs (USAid 2011, 14). This creative funding method 
allows smaller organizations to continue working without having to apply for permission to 
receive foreign funding under Egyptian Law No. 84 (2002). Larger NGOs like MEK and MYF 
also have created a way to insure that they receive foreign funding by creating branch 
organizations or becoming a branch organization so that the donors in other countries can donate 
directly to them.  
 MEK is an Egyptian NGO, which has focused on non-profit development since 2007. It 
works to train Egyptian individuals in the areas of health, education, scientific research, and 
social solidarity (Misr El Kheir Foundation [MEK] 2014). MEK has branches in both the United 
States and the United Kingdoms that provide funding for the projects in Egypt. The funding 
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raised this way is much easier to rely on, because these branches are not subjected to the 
Egyptian governmental regulations (MEK Foundation UK 2014, MEK Foundation USA 2014).  
Magdy Yacoub Foundation (MYF) delivers free medical care to the poor in Egypt. 
Founded in 2008 this organization has created a partnership with the American Friends of Magdi 
Yacoub Heart Foundation, which has a partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation (KBF) in 
the United States (see Magdy Yacoub Foundation). This allows MYF to advertise its donations 
to individuals, by stating that all one has to do is to donate through KBF directly to MYF (Magdy 
Yacoub Foundation). This allows MYF to supply Americans a way to donate, which is tax 
deductible. MYF also has a constant source of foreign funding, so they do not have to apply for 
new grants from organizations outside the country.  
Through creating constant forms of revenue through partner or branch organizations, 
MYF and MEK achieve donation security. Because of a lengthy application process seeking the 
government’s approval many Egyptian NGOs fear losing their donors. The organizations, such 
as MYF and MEK, have created their own outside organizations that can produce a more reliable 
source of funding. This also allows such NGOS to support smaller CSOs through sub-grants; this 
would not be possible in light of an extended application process for governmental approval. 
In Egypt, organizations navigate restriction by relying on funding from partnerships with 
outside organizations and the communities they serve, as well as by creatively using data to 
promote and expand their programs. On the other hand, in Tunisia, organizations deploy a 
different set of strategies, including using micro financing to become self-sufficient, utilizing 
techniques to become more attractive to donors, and building partnerships with other 
organizations to create and maintain their unique programs. These differences in NGOs’ 
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strategies between Egypt and Tunisia are reliant on the differences in governmental restrictions 
in each country. 
Tunisia 
Demographic Profile and Historical Background 
Tunisia, located in North Africa, was invaded and ruled by the Roman Empire from the 
2nd to the 7th century BCE; the Byzantine Empire succeeded the Romans (Stewart 2014, 72). A 
series of Muslim rulers followed the Empire. Amazighs or Imazigh people (term meaning “free 
people”, aka “the Berbers”) populated Tunisia at the time. These original inhabitants of North 
Africa had their own Afro-Asiatic language and their own culture that currently is undergoing 
revival (Stewart 2014, 51-52). These native people converted to Islam starting in the 7th century. 
The area remained under the rule of Muslim Empires until 1881, when Tunisia fell under French 
colonial rule (Stewart 2014, 101).  
In 1956, after an armed resistance, Tunisia won its independence from France (Stewart 
2014, 102). Since then Tunisia has had two presidents: Habib Bourguiba, who became Tunisia’s 
president and prime minister in 1957 and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (Egger 2008, 426). Supported 
by the Democratic Constitutional Rally, Ben Ali ruled Tunisia starting in 1987 until the Arab 
Spring in 2011 (Stewart 2014, 52).  
A Tunisian man’s death started the Arab Spring in the region; Muhammed Bouazizi set 
himself on fire in protest of government harassment in 2010 (Anderson 2014, 50). The popular 
protests followed. As a result, the long term President, Ben Ali, had to step down and flee to 
Saudi Arabia. In October of 2011, Tunisia held elections for a 217 member Constitutional 
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Assembly, who instated an interim president, Monocef Marzouki (Stewart 2014, 158). Tunisia 
held presidential elections in November of 2014, where Beji Caid Essebsi beat the incumbent 
Moncef Marzouki, though no party received a majority of the votes (Aljazeera 2014). As a result, 
a second election took place on December 21st, 2014 in which Tunisia's Beji Caid Essebsi was 
elected president (BBC, 2014) 
Tunisia has a total population of 10.5 million with a population density of 63 people per 
km2 (Stewart 2014, 36). The country’s GNI is $3480 and an unemployment rate is 27 percent 
(Stewart 2014, 192). Tunisia is rated a seven in political freedoms, five in civil freedom, and has 
a status of Not Free according to the Freedom House6 (Stewart 2014, 240). 
Government Restrictions 
Unlike Egypt, the Tunisian government places very few restrictions on receiving outside 
funding. Instead, in Tunisia, the government imposes direct control over NGOs by requiring all 
NGOs to be affiliated with the state. As a part of the plan to control NGOs, Tunisian government 
created a large group of governmental NGOs (GNGOs), which look like independent 
organizations but serve the needs and interests of the government (Pitner 2000, 35). GNGOs 
promote the government’s political agenda and spy on other organizations. GNGOs’ 
participation in international conferences exemplifies the effects of the government’s control 
(Pitner 2000, 35).  
The presence of GNGOs at international conferences promotes pro-regime views and 
agenda by presenting information the government wants the world to know (Pitner 2000, 35). 
                                                          








GNGOs hold this power because NGOs are afraid that a GNGO will report them to the 
government, which may lead to the arrest of an NGO’s members and/or its disbandment. In 
many cases, NGOs do not even make it to international conferences. The government exercises 
its ability to restrict international travel of NGOs’ members by confiscating their passports right 
before the trip. In such cases, GNGOs are the only NGOs that attended the conference. Pitner 
(2000, 35) exemplifies such power dynamics by reporting that,  
In 1996, two legitimate Tunisian human rights representatives were invited to give 
presentations at an international human rights conference on torture. A third organization, 
Jeunes Medecines sans Frontieres (Young Doctors without Borders), was invited later at 
the request of another NGO, whose members had met their representatives at a 
conference on torture in South Africa earlier that year. After the invitation was issued, the 
initial two Tunisian NGO representatives had their passports revoked while the Jeunes 
Medecines sans Frontieres requested to bring two additional representatives. Medecines 
sans Frontieres in France then sent the conference organizers a letter of protest about the 
inclusion of this group, which was "in no way affiliated" with them. After extensive 
inquiries from reliable sources, the conference organizers established that this 
"organization" was indeed a GNGO comprised of Tunisian intelligence agents. 
 As a result of situations like these, it is often only the government’s views that are expressed at 
international conferences, while independent Tunisian NGOs are excluded from global visibility 
and recognition and building global networks (Pitner 2000, 35).  
 In addition, the Tunisian government indirectly controls NGOs through the media. This 
allows the government to blackout NGOs’ publications in order to stop the spread of information 
about these organizations’ program (Gilman 2007, 116). For example, the government blocked 
all the media coverage the Centere d’Encounters, created by the Association Tunisienne des 
Femmes Democrates (ATFD), in an attempt to close the center (Gilman 2007, 114).  
Navigating Restrictions: Tunisian NGOs 
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In order to creatively navigate their socio-political and economic environment, Tunisian 
NGOs, such as Enda and Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates (ATFD) have spent 
decades shaping and forming their programs. Reflecting the government’s restrictions, there is a 
lack of information about these organizations and the work they are doing. By using archival and 
Internet resources, I was able to derive enough information to create a profile for Enda and 
ATFD. What makes these NGOs stand out among others is that Enda is an NGO that is no 
longer reliant on external funding, and ATFD, a women’s organization, has struggled through 
governmental regulations to remain in business and independent.  
Enda, a Tunisian international NGO creatively navigates the economic environment by 
establishing itself as a micro-financing agency. Originally, Enda engaged in career training and 
support, and relied on other organizations’ help to sustain its projects. In 1995, Enda started a 
micro financing program, and by 2000, was able to financially sustain itself (Enda Inter-Arabe. 
2014). This, in turn, allows Enda to use money from donors to expand and grow its organization. 
As a result, this NGO can be selective of its partnerships and new programs, as it is not 
constantly trying to make money to support its staff.  
When Enda needs donor support in order to start a new project or open a new branch, it 
creates a donor-friendly environment through cooperation with consulting companies and 
through an easy to navigate website (Enda Inter-Arabe. 2014). As a result of working with the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Enda has been awarded a five “diamond” rating 
for financial transparency. This indicates to donors that this NGO is a reliable organization and 
that money donated to the NGO will be used efficiently and effectively; this makes Edna 
attractive to donors (Enda Inter-Arabe, 2014).  
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In addition, Enda’s website contains information not only about the organization, but also 
their partner-organizations, awards it receives, and projects it has completed. The NGO’s website 
is eye-catching and user-friendly. For example, Enda provides a link to its annual program report 
in a large folder icon that appears on the bottom right-hand side of the screen. By creating an 
efficient website Enda allows potential donors to find information quickly, easily, and helps to 
assure a potential donor of Enda’s capabilities as a reliable partner (Enda Inter-Arabe. 2014). By 
using this creative approach, Enda has made itself an NGO that does not need to rely on external 
funding to sustain its organization. Instead, the NGO can focus on creating projects that reflect 
the needs of the community and producing reports that are easy to access; this leads to expanding 
Enda’s projects throughout Tunisia.  
The Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates (ATFD), popularly known as 
Femmes Democrates, is a women’s rights organization founded in 1989 in Tunisia (Gilman 
2007, 98). ATFD is the only autonomous women’s organization in Tunisia, and the only one to 
be classified as a protest group (Gilman 2007, 98). ATFD’s work focuses on hosting conferences 
and promoting women’s equality in Tunisia. A large part of this includes working with the 
Tunisian government’s associate NGOs. Yet, by working with these NGOs, ATFD risks its 
status of being an independent organization by being absorbed into the government’s control 
(Gilman 2007, 101). As a result, this NGO has to establish its independence from the 
government’s agenda.  
One of the main ways the ATFD has maintained its autonomy is by creating an “identity 
solidarity transnational link” to keep the organization’s work beyond the reach of the Tunisian 
state (Gilman 2007,109). This “identity solidarity transnational link” is a partnership with 
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organizations not necessarily recognized in Tunisia, but that is still working within the country’s 
boarders. For example, ATFD is partnered with the organization named Collectif. Collectif is a 
women’s organization that is recognized by the Moroccan government, but not by the Tunisian 
government. By working with Collectif, ATFD functions as an “off the books” organization. 
This status allows ATFD to work with Collectif, creating programs and participate in various 
events, as a non-monitored organization, avoiding being co-opted by the state, and the state’s 
heavy-handed control (Gilman 2007, 106-107).  
ATFD is also very adaptive and creative when it comes to other obstacles created by the 
government. For instance, during an AISHA Network7 conference hosted by the ATFD, there 
was a major backlash against the ATFD from the media. In order to avoid and combat the 
negative portrayal, ATFD wrote letters and petitioned against the negative coverage of their 
event and did not confront or press charges against the state-controlled media (Gilman 2007, 
108). This technique helped the NGO to maintain its face and avoid retribution by the 
government.  
Another example of being creative and using its networks, is ATFD’s creation of 
subsidiary organizations, such as the Centere d’Encounters,. This center, which helps abused 
women, was the first of its kind in Tunisia. The government did not support this center and, in 
response, created a media blackout around the center. This blackout included a prohibition of 
publication of press releases or any coverage of the center by the ATFD. As a result, this NGO 
was unable to promote the Centere. Yet, the Centere’s uniqueness helped ATFD to advertise it 
through word of mouth. The members of ATFD used word of mouth through not only their own 
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social circles, but also by sharing information about the Centere within social circles of other 
feminist organizations, both GNGOs and NGOs (Gilman 2007, 114). Through partnerships with 
the GNGOs (governmental NGOs), ATFD was able to build a network that would promote a 
program, which the government disapproved. Even the organizations sharing the government’s 
agenda realized the need for such centers in Tunisia. As a result, these organizations and doctors 
chose to inform clients of where to get help for abuse. This word of mouth technique makes it 
difficult for the government to trace who is promoting the program, thus protecting ATFD’s and 
GNGO’s workers.  
ATFD strives to be independent from the government, and, as a result, runs into many 
challenges in Tunisia. These challenges force ATFD to be creative by employing various 
techniques, such as associating with unofficial international organizations and using well-
established personal and social networks to combat government media backlash and blackouts. 
This creativity allows ATFD to remain outside the government’s control. 
In Tunisia, NGOs such as Enda and ATFS use strategies such as micro-financing, multi-
organizational partnerships, and creative utilization of resources such as the Internet and word of 
mouth, to navigate restrictions and better server their communities. Alternatively, in Morocco, 
because of a different governmental environment, NGOs use strategies such as partnerships with 
outside funding organizations and international networks to navigate restrictions. 
Morocco 
Demographic Profile and Historical Background 
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Morocco is located in North Africa. The Amazighs people, who converted to Islam in in 
the late 7th century, originally inhabited Morocco. The Abbasid caliphate ruled Morocco from 
780 until 985 (Stewart 2014, 88). After the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate, two Amazigh-led 
Muslim Dynasties ruled Morocco. The first was the Almoravids Dynasty who ruled from 1040-
1147 followed by the Almohads (1147-1269) (Stewart 2014, 88). With the end of the Almohads 
came a series of successor states. The first to rule Morocco (1215 - 1465) among the Amazighs 
dynasties was the Marinids. The next was the Wattasid dynasty (1420 – 1547). In 1554, the 
Saadi dynasty restored Arab rule in the country (1554-1659) (Stewart 2014, 88). Morrocco 
became the Alawite monarchy in 1666. That year, Moulay Rashid took control of Morocco. With 
Rashid’s death in 1672, his brother, Moulay Isma’il, took power and ruled until 1727 (Egger 
2008,128).  
In 1912 the French took power from the Alawite king, making Morocco a French 
protectorate (Stewart 2014, 10). In 1956, after an armed resistance, the Moroccans gained their 
independence from France. In 1961, King Hassan II came to power in Morocco and ruled until 
his death in 1999. His son, Mohammed VI, succeeded the king. Stewart (2014) argues that 
Mohammad VI is a much more liberal than his father; he started several reforms in Moroccan 
society. For example, in 2004 he established the commission on Equality and reconciliation, 
which addressed human right violations at the time of his father’s rule.  
Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the people elect a bicameral legislature 
every three years. In 2010 Morocco experienced protests as part of the Arab Spring. Yet King 
Mohammad VI has remained in power appeasing the public with reforms (Stewart 2014, 156).  
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Morocco has a total population of 31.9 million people, with a population density of 70 
people per km2. The country’s has a Gross National Income (GNI) of $14,330 (Stewart 2014, 36, 
192). The unemployment rate is 16 %. According the Freedom House, Morocco has a five for 
political freedom, a four for civil freedoms, and a status of “Partially Free” (Stewart 2014, 240).  
Government Restrictions 
In Morocco, the political field in which NGOs operate is constantly changing. El-Glaoui, 
(1999, 160) explains that in the 1980s and 1990s, the government kept tabs on all NGOs 
deciding which one of them would have legal status. This restricted the types of NGOs that were 
created as well as the issues that could be addressed by NGOs (El-Glaoui 1999, 160).  
 Moroccan NGOs continued pushing their demands. These efforts resulted in a policy 
change after the Arab Spring protests (USAid 2011, 38). This policy change severely limited the 
government’s ability to control NGOs directly. The new law stated that NGOs still had to 
register with the state, but that the state is unable to deny the creation of an NGO (USAid 2011, 
38). Additionally, NGOs can register as “public interest” organizations, which gives NGOs tax 
exemptions (USAid 2011, 39). Yet this process is long, and many smaller NGOs cannot afford to 
register (USAid 2011, 39). In the past, it was this registration that resulted in NGOs receiving 
funds from the government in a form of government contracts. Now, any non-governmental 
organization registered with the government is allowed to apply and receive these funds (USAid 
2011, 39). 
In Tunisia, working with the government creates barriers and limitation on organizations, 
and in Egypt, the government regulates organizations’ abilities to bring in foreign donors. 
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Morocco, however, does not seem to have these problems. Laurie A. Brand (1998. 66), a scholar 
of international relations and Middle Eastern studies, writes, 
On the other hand, direct Moroccan government interference or harassment was not 
mentioned by any of those interviewed, although at times the state has made its 
displeasure clear, and the foreign institutions themselves certainly take into consideration 
the political climate in their decisions to propose or fund projects. 
 While institutions take into consideration how the government might react to specific programs, 
the local organizations do not see the government actually interfering with their programs, 
because, “The state appears not to have the resources to put into such projects and is either 
indifferent or content to see the initiative taken by an outside agency” (Brand 1998, 66). The 
Moroccan government needs these programs to help the country, and thus, interfering with or 
prohibiting NGOs’ work is not in its best interest. Since the only state regulations for NGOs are 
to work only with other licensed organizations and make the information about the events and 
projects they are engaged in or sponsor public, NGOs work with outside donors without fear of 
the government’s backlash (Brand 1998, 66). 
NGO’s in Morocco have faced a series of different restrictions from the government. 
These include a highly selective registration process and the promotion and funding of specific 
NGOs. As a result of the Arab Spring, in order to improve the lives of general population and its 
approval ratings, the government instituted an open registration policy. Yet, these changes come 
hand-in-hand with a new set of restrictions and difficulties for NGOs; these include NGOs’ 
inability to apply for governmental grants and contracts due to the long application process. 
Navigating Restrictions: Moroccan NGOs 
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Moroccan NGOs, such as Al-Amana8 and the Najia Belghazi Center9, see the Moroccan 
government not as a major obstacle, but in many cases, as a beneficial partner for their programs. 
Yet even with governmental partnerships, NGOs can find it difficult to secure outside funding. 
As a result, these organizations create outside partnerships either through contractual agreements 
or through international networking. These outside partners help to secure funding, but in some 
cases, they can hinder these NGOs’ local legitimacy. 
In Morocco, NGOs have creatively navigated government restrictions by becoming a part 
of governmental programs. Khrouz (2008, 46), an economist , reports that in 1996, the 
government of Morocco realized that the country was in need of aid. This resulted in the 
government and international donors contributing thousands of dollars to promote and support 
local NGOs (Khrouz). This support became a startup of many NGOs, particularly those in the 
field of micro-financing. These NGOs include the Al-Amana Micro Financing Institution, which 
has helped over 800,000 people as of 2007 (Khrouz 2008, 46). Al-Amana, like some other 
NGOs, also works with an international non-profit organization called Grameen-Jameel 
(Grameen-Jameel. “Al Amana Microfinance”).  
Grameen-Jameel, an international non-governmental organization jointly owned by the 
Grameen Foundation and Abdul Latif Jameel, offers loans and grants to their Micro-Financing 
Institution’s (MFI) partners (Grameen-Jameel. “Who We Are”, “What We Do”). The Grameen 
Foundation is an organization, which helps the poor by providing access to financial services. 
Abdul Lative Jameel is an organization founded by the Sheikh Abdul Latif Jameel, a wealthy 
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9 A center for women going through marital problems or divorce.  
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international entrepreneur from Saudi Arabia. The combination of a business run by a wealthy 
Saudi philanthropist and the Grameen Foundation enables Grameen-Jameel to partner with local 
organizations and provide them with grants or loans (Grameen-Jameel. “Who We Are”).  
By signing such partnership agreements, other non-profit organizations, like Al-Amana, 
acquire an ability to receive a grant or take a business loan, which they can pay back (Grameen-
Jameel. “Al Amana Microfinance”). Such partnerships allows NGOs to receive money from a 
reliable source, and, at the same time, allows donors to loan out money that will eventually be 
repaid to them; this, in turn, creates a constant cycle of money in a closed financing system. Such 
a system facilitates local non-profit organizations’ growth without constantly worrying about 
funding.  
Outside funding, however, comes with its own conflicts and competing agendas. 
Women’s organizations in Morocco exemplify such dynamics, 
 In the post 1990 period, when external funding began to flow, women’s groups found 
their agendas shaped by the projects for which they could secure funding. While these 
were not projects they did not want to undertake, the funding has often shaped the 
concentration of efforts in ways that do not necessarily reflect Moroccan priorities (Brand 
1998, 66).  
To secure funding, many NGOs shape programs for donors instead of for the community, and 
give up their own projects to meet the needs of donors.  
This is not always the case. Brand (1998, 66) explains that a famous Moroccan academic, 
feminist, and activist, “Fatima Mernissi had approached USIS about funding a center for battered 
women. They turned her down on the grounds that this did not really fit within their purview” 
(Brand 1998, 66). This show a perfect example in which NGOs are denied funds because it’s not 
what the donors wanted. Brand notes, though, that “ Mernissi subsequently went to the Germans 
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and obtained the funding she wanted” (Brand 1998, 66). This shows that there are other donors 
out there willing to support a cause; finding such donors, however, can be difficult. While 
women such as Fatima Mernissi may have the connections to find donors, not all NGOs are able 
to do so, and thus, may settle by adjusting their programs to donors’ expectations. 
The Najia Belghazi Center in Fes, is an example of an organization of women who do not 
have international connections or easy access to funding. The Najia Belghazi Center helps 
women report domestic abuse violations by offering free legal advice. Volunteers run this 
organization; few of them are professional lawyers. These female volunteers do not have 
international connections or the time to meet with donors to find funding. To overcome this, the 
Najia Belghazi Center participates in the international conversation on women’s rights. This 
allows the NGO to create and maintain networks and visit other NGOs in Europe and North 
America (Newcomb 2009, 98). Through this international network, the volunteers at the Najia 
Belghazi Center receive information on grant possibilities, training initiatives, and the newest 
data and research on violence against women (Newcomb 2009, 98).  
Grant money received from donors is used to create other programs aimed at training 
women lacking financial resources to work for themselves (Newcomb 2009, 99). Yet this money 
also causes problems. Brand (1998, 67) found that,  
The association of many women’s organizations with foreign funding institutions, in 
addition to their largely secularist message and their generally leftist pasts, makes them 
particularly vulnerable to charges of being agents of neoimperialism or of betraying 
indigenous traditions and values. 
The Najia Belghazi Center found this through personal experiences. Newcomb (2009, 
100), an anthropologist, concluded that, “Because of public perceptions, the center faced 
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difficulties recruiting professionals interested in volunteering their time, which made the task of 
solving such a wide range of problems even more overwhelming.” With the perception of the 
center being skewed in one direction by its donors, NGOs such as Najia Belghazi Center have a 
hard time finding volunteers. In addition, the center often falls into a professional client 
mentality that causes stress to the volunteers, as women come looking for money or a free 
lawyer. This stress and combating a perception of the “Western” influence there seems to be a 
little reason for volunteers to stay. However, many volunteers stay due to the feeling that their 
work is important; without the feeling that their work means something, they would not 
volunteer at all (Newcomb 2009, 101).  
NGOs in Morocco use partnerships with other organizations to create an environment 
where NGOs have access to grants and loans. While for Al-Amana these partnerships sustain 
their programs with no perceived backlash, the Nanjia Belghazi Center finds that this aid, while 
extremely useful, has its own negative backlash they have to work against. 
Conclusion 
  NGOs in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco creatively navigate the restrictions placed on 
them by their governments and donors. They do this by finding alternative funding options, such 
as local donations, foreign branches and micro financing; creating partnerships; and utilizing 
resources, such as websites, data collection, and networks. 
Finding Alternative Funding: Enda and Al-Halil 
In Tunisia and Egypt, NGOs use alternative ways to fund programs. Enda, a Tunisian 
NGO, uses micro-financing to fund itself and become self-sufficient, while Al-Halil, an Egyptian 
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NGO, uses donations made by local individuals and organizations to run projects. While 
donations are not always a reliable source of funding, this method works well for Al-Halil. With 
Islamic based projects, which have expanded to teach sanitation and job skills, Al-Halil’s 
funding from the community is enough and micro-financing does not fit into this NGO’s 
organizational scope. On the other hand, Enda, which started as a skill-training organization that 
expanded into micro-financing, would be unable to rely on the community for the scope and 
types of projects they host. The transition to micro-financing was a logical step for Edna as it 
was able to supply loans to people to help with skill training. In the case of alternative funding 
for programs, the NGO’s goals and environment impact which methods are most effective. 
Partnerships: MEK, MYF and Al-Amana 
Many non-governmental organizations use partnerships to navigate funding restrictions. 
In Egypt, MEK10 and MYF11 use partnerships with outside organizations to create a stream of 
international donations, which may bypass Egypt’s funding regulations. By becoming a partner 
of other organizations, they have set up branches of their own organization internationally; thus, 
donations to their international branches can be brought into the state as their own funds and not 
that of an international donor. These two organizations then offer domestic grants to smaller 
NGOs in the area. In Morocco, Al-Amana also partners with an outside organization to create a 
reliable source of funding. By partnering with Jameel Grameen, Al-Amana and other 
organizations are supplied with grants and loans instead of constantly looking for other sources 
of funding. This method of partnering to receive funding allows organizations to navigate around 
                                                          
10 Misr El Kheir Foundation 
11 Magdy Yacoub Foundation 
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both governmental restrictions and the constant lengthy and burdensome application process for 
international funding 
Egyptian, Tunisian, and Moroccan NGOs all use some form of partnership to navigate 
restrictions. In Tunisia, organizations such as ATFD12 partner with other organizations to further 
promote their cause, as well as balance governmental regulations. ATFD’s partnerships with 
GNGOs and non-recognized NGOs are a balancing act, working between staying in the 
government’s favor and rebelling in order to spread information it finds important. These 
partnerships have also supplied ATFD with a network of organizations, which will support 
unique projects such as the Center d’Ecounters, even if the government does not approve these 
projects. On the other hand, Moroccan organization uses international networks to receive up-to-
date information on grant opportunities and new scholarly research, which the volunteers would 
not have been able to access otherwise. While in Tunisia, ATFD is in a balancing act to keep the 
government happy while sticking to their mission. As a result of such partnerships, some NGOs, 
such as Najia Belghazi Center in Morocco, face backlash from their local communities. 
Technology, Online Communication, and Data: Al-Halil and Enda 
NGOs in Tunisia and Egypt creatively navigate restrictions by using the unique 
utilization of available resources. Enda uses consulting organizations and their website to attract 
donors while Al-Halil uses data collection, usually required by donors, to find and understand 
what would incentivize its clients. These two methods are achieving two different goals and 
navigating different restrictions, and show a difference in the restrictions each NGO faces and 
navigates. 
                                                          
12 Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates 
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In sum, all NGOs will run into restrictions whether from their government or from 
donors. These restrictions vary based on the country, the type of NGO, and the communities they 
operate in. Many NGOs will find creative solutions to navigate these restrictions. Some of the 
solutions will be similar, while others will be completely unique. Yet despite the specific 
variations in the strategies from NGO to NGO, the fact that each one has its own is noteworthy 
in that these particular strategies allow NGOs to more effectively serve their communities. As 
the Middle East and North Africa continue to change, the restrictions placed on NGOs by the 
government and the types of organizations that develop will change; and ultimately, navigation 
strategies will also change. Therefore, it is important to study the navigational methods and 
strategies used by NGOs in this region due to the fluid political scene, as well as an overall lack 
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